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STATE1:iEl1T CF SEU1'..TOP.. rvn:<E 1-lf...i·iSFIELD (D., NCN'tt.HA)

FOREIGN RELATIONS:

LATE-Stn·1i:11ER 1959

Mr. President:
It may seem at this moment a remote possibility, but at
some point the first session of the 36th Congress will come to a
close.

The first snm-1s of 't'7inter will undoubtedly have settled on

the mountains of Montana by the time the final gavel falls.

It

may be that the first snows will have even descended in Washington.
Sooner or later, however, we shall finish the work of this session.
And sooner or later we shall adjourn.
I have sought the floor today in the

~~ectation--perhaps

unwarranted--that adjournment may come sooner rather than later.
I have sought i1: in order to ma!ce certain summary remarks on the
international situation and the present state of the nation's
foreign relations.
It is not easy to draw up a balance sheet of this kind.
Yet the attempt to do so on other occasions, I believe, has been
helpful and it may prove to be helpful now.
In broad terms, I suppose, one might say that since the
nation is not fighting a war in this late-summer 1959, the balance
sheet is fine.

That sort of observation, comforti ng though it may

be, tells us nothing of the stubborn international realities with
which we m1.1. ..st live, with wh:.tch we nrust continue to contend.

0

•
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It may be good politics to say that the absence of fighting on our part proves how successful our foreign policy has been.
It may make for happy headlines.

It may be good politics, but I

do not know that it is good government.

This superficial observa-

tion produces a false sense of security in the nation.
the very

l~kely

It masks

possibility that we may be at a peace of sorts--

not necessarily because of our policies, but in spite of some of
them, and that pieces may now be falling into place in the complex
pattern of international relations which, when fully assemblied,
may fuse in the full fury

of nuclear war.

The observation that we have peace, moreover, shunts aside
the domestic implications of present international policies.

It

completely ignores the grave burden of taxation, and the inflationary pressures which arise from the enormous cost of the defense
establishment and overseas activities of various kinds which are
involved in maintaining this so-called peace.

We do not know,

really, with any degree of precision the needs of any of these
operations or how efficiently any are run.

All we know is that

these defense and other operations--as much as the Congress will
allow--are pressed upon us on the grounds that they are required
to maintain this so-called peace.

At the same time, the Administra-

tion has admonished the Congress to limit the buildup of essential
domestic services and activities in education, housing, road construction, social security, slum clearance, law enforcement, resource development and countless others under a budget which goes
overwhelmingly for defense and international programs of one kind
or

anothe~.
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In short, to maintain this peace of sorts, we are eating

into--or at any rate, not bui ldi ng adequately--our capital investment in the social structure of the nation.

That may be unavoidable

in present c i rcumstances but when we talk lightly of having peace-let us not lose sight of what l'le are doing and of the monumental
problems which the neglect of domestic needs is building up for the
years ahead.
Hho can speak, in all honesty, of the exi stence of peace
in this late-summer of 1959 when the continent of Europe remains
di vided by hosti le &id unreconci led i deologies and other spawns of
confli ct?

Uhen the concept of live and let live l1hich encourages

men and nati ons to rational settlement of their di fficulties has
still so little depth in that key region?

Hhen \olestern Europe

shows evidence of serious fissures in its essential unity?
t-Jho can speak, i n all honesty, of peace l"lhen a wall of
ignorance builds ever higher betl7een this nation and China and behind it there develops a nel·1 and explosi ve pm·1er nurtured heavily
on hatred of the United States?

While this situati on prevails, to

talk glibly about the existence of peace today may be to exact a
terrible price out of our children's tomorrow.
t.J'OO can speak, in all honesty, of peace when in the great
arc of nations extendi ng from Korea, around the rim of Asia,
through the t·1iddle East and Africa and even into the nearby Caribbean, there are only scattered oases of stability?

t~en

in this

vast area, too often there exists a seething violence just beneath
the surface of daily life?

t~en

whole peoples grow restless in the

search for new roots to feed their survival and grol'lth?

- 4 Mr. President, by ignoring such realities as these, I
suppose one may concoct a bright balance sheet of the world situation and find in it reason to pride ourselves on the success of
our foreign policies and their administration.

Unfortunately, it

also gives us cause for national self-delusion and I, for one,
cannot certify to any such balance sheet.

Equally, I cannot join

those who, seeing only such realities as I have just enumerated,
are plunged into a cynical gloom, a deadening hopelessness over the
fate of the nation and mankind.
No, Mr. President, I do not believe that we can conclude,
from the present situation, either the certainty of a durable peace
and continued progress, or the inevitability of retrogression and
tragic war.

The international situation in late-summer 1959, as

it has been for some time, is neither black nor white but many

shades of gray.

It would be best to dispell any illusions that

we have peace in our times and count mankind lucky that we even
have peace for this day.
As a nation, we are still in the midst of a gigantic
and enormously expensive holding action throughout the world.

At

some critical points in this action there are rays of hope that
potential conflicts will yield to reason

o~,

at least, that the

vast cost of the holding action can be reduced.

At others, we are

staging merely a rear-guard action in which the way to a durable
peace is not yet even dimly seen.
We will do well, therefore, to put aside the glib evaluation of the state of the world as being one of peace in this latesunmer of 1959 and the state of our foreign policy as being one of
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success.

At best,

tl~

nat~on

world and this

just barely got its head above 'tqater.
generalization that is

ap~licable,

as a part of it, has

If there is any broad

it is that we are in a period of

change in which we may go down or up but one in which--in any event-we cannot remain just where we are.

In these circumstances we shall

increase our prospects of find:i.ng the "1ay up, the

T.!18:J

to peace, only

as we turn our attention to the specifics, to the principal problems
which confront us in the world.

He shall find our way only as 't'le

try to gauge accurately the changing content of these problems, only
as 'tole e)tamine and reexamine honestly the present policies by which
we are seeking to deal with these problems and 't·leigh and re-'t'leigh
the effectiveness of the

admin~tration

of these policies.

In short,

in an era of change in international relations ue need to understand
clearly the possibilities of the change and be prompt to act on
If we fail to do so we shall be left high and dry as the tide

them.

of change moves on and away from us.

Germany
In one critical area,
su~e

r~ .

President , in Germany, the pres-

for change is great and it is rising.

within Germany, within Europe, perhaps even

It

~s

with~ n

fed by developments
the Soviet Union

itself.
He may now be in a position to deal more successfully with
these pressures than in the past.

By successfully, let me add, I

mean we may be able to deal with them in a way that leads towards
a more durable peace without prejudice to freedom.

Certainly, Mr.

- 6 ...
President, during the 86th Congress we have sharpened the tools of
foreign policy for coping with the complex
policies have been recast.

Ger~an

situation.

Our

vlithout aleration :tn basic principle,

they have been redesigned more closely in line with the realities
of the Germany and Europe of 1959 rather than of 1950 or 1945.

In

a phrase, we have refurbished these policies and brought them up to
date.
True, the division in Berlin, Germany and, in a larger
sense, in Europe has not yet ended.

But at least, the revisions

of our policy have helped to deflect, for the present, the headlong
plunge towards open conflict in Berlin.

At least, there is now

some chance that the exchanges of heads and near-heads of states
may set in motion more tangible action on peace than the generalities which emerged from Geneva in 1955.

There is no guarantee that

such will be the result but at least the hope is alive.
There is credit enough for all in this achievement.

It

is due in no small measure to the final efforts of the late Secretary of State.

In his last visit to Europe and in his final press

stAtements Mr. Dulles set the stage for what has become a fresh, a
positive Hestern approach to the problems of Germany.
This Congress has also made its contribution.

For one

thing, the Senate took the German question out of the deep-freeze.
It opened the question to full discussion and let in new thought
and new ideas where for years there had been only ritualistic
repetition of the old, the tired and the increasingly unreal.

Dis-

tinguished Members of this body, the outstanding Chairman of the

•
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Foreign Relations Committee

(~tt.

Fulbright), the Senator from West

Virginia (l1r. Byrd), the Senator from Pennsylvani a (Hr. Clark), the
Senator from Connecti cut (i1r. Dodd), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Cooper), the Senator from New Yorh:. (Hr. Javits), the Senator from
Alabama

( t~.

Sparkman), and others joined in these discussions at

various t i mes.

And out of this many-si ded debate emerged, I am

sure, much that was usefu l for those charged wi th administering
foreign policy.
The work of the President of the Senate (Mr. Nixon) on
the occasion of his voyage to rrussi a and Poland was also of the
greatest i mportance.

He made an outstanding effort to bridge the

almost unbridgeable gap in understanding between Russi a and the
United States and to enlarge the measure of

c iv~ l i ty

i n the relations

between the t'\-tO nations.
1·1 r.

Herter's work at Geneva, in difficult circumstances,

was skillful and dedicated.

In cooperation wi th other Western na•

tions he succeeded in reinterpreti ng Hestem polici es '\'lith respect
to Germany in the light of today's realiti es rather than yesterday's
Empectations.

He set forth new proposals '\-lhose s i gnifi cance is not

likely to be lost on the rest of the world, even though they may
have fallen on deaf ears as regards the Sovi et Foreign Minister at
Geneva.

One may hope, even, that thei r significance will not be

lost on Mr. Khrushchev.

Only last February he i ndi cated that very

similar proposals which I had l i sted in a speech i n the Senate could
form the basis for reasonable negoti ation.

- 8 ...

Berlin
As for Berlin, Nr. President, that city was and still is
the crux of danger in Germany.

I say that

not~Tithstanding

the fact

that the crisis-date which was originally concocted by the Soviet
Union has come and long since gone without serious incident.

I say

that because Berlin in its location, in its continued division and
uncertain status still contains live seeds of conflict.

I say that

because a divided alien occupation of that city--Soviet and Western
alike--is an &1achronism almost a decade and a half after the end
of war.

I say that because the close proximity of antagonistic

forces in the legal no-man's land of Berlin constitutes a serious
source of accidental or spontaneous military combustion.
Hhatever it may appear to be from the Soviet point of
view, from the vlestern point of view, I believe, it is time for a
change in Berlin.

But let me stress,

~~.

President, that when I

suggest that it is time for a change I do not mean a change in
West Berlin alone, as the communists would have it.

It is time

for a change in all Berlin.
Because I believe that in any give and take negotiation,
both parts of Berlin must be involved 2 I find it disconcerting to
discover that Western diplomacy has permitted the discussion of the
Berlin issue to center more and more on the status of Hest nerlin
alone.

I do not see that this issue--this issue of a dangerously

divided Berlin--is an issue of viestern troop levels in the city.
Nor is it one of the type of arms which vJestern troops may bear in
that city.

It is not one of 'qhether the Russians will or will not

- 9 guarantee our rights there for one yea.r, f :tve years _2: forever.
Yet 2 these matters t'lere the center of discussion regarding Berlin
at Geneva.

It seems to me that i f we mean it when we say

't:1e

shall

stand fast in vlest Berlin, these are not matters for discussion.
To permit talks with the Soviet Union to center on them
seems to me to reveal a temptation to buy the conti nuance of our
presence in Berlin at the price of unilateral

concess~ons.

I do

not believe that will work, for the price once paid is likely to go
higher and higher.
bought?

vle

And even if :tt did \'lot:k, what would we have

would have bought nothing more than an indefinite and

expensive prolongation of the present tmsatisfactory, costly and
unstable occupation.

He t'lould not have advanced one step towards a

more rati onal, a more durable peace.
tion continue,

~~.

Until when t'lould this occupa-

President? Unti l 1970, 1900 , until the year,

2000?

If the issue is not negotiable by a change in the status
of West Berlin alone, is i t negotiable by a change in the status of
all nerlin--of Hest Berlin and East I3erlin7

It t'lill not be negoti-

able in these terms if those who use the words of peace are not
prepared to act for peace.

l-Je shall not knot-7 whether that is the

case, however 2 unless we are clear in our o\'m minds that we seek,
as a positive act for peace, a new status for all Berlin.

If we

are clear on that point then I believe we may, with profit to all,
assume the advocacy of internati onalization of the entire city, on

an interim basis, until it ·i s once again the capital of a unified
Germany.

•

- 10 Again, let me stress, i t is one thi ng to internati onalize
only Hest Berlin under the auspices of the United Nations as the
Russians have

proposed~

I~

would be an entirely different matter

to internationalize the entire city of Berlin--East and West--under
those

ausp~ces 2

as an interim arrangement.

In that there might well

be a valid quid pro quo.
In recent days there have been reportg that the Russians
are prepared to accept Hest Gennans as replacements for the nonGerman garrisons now in vlest nerH.n.
whether these reports are accurate.

I havs.._no 't-7ay o!,_ tel_l:_ing
If there i s any truth i.n them,

I do not see that the idea should be rejected out of hand.

On the

contrary, the idea may well be advanced for exploration by the
Hestern natiore themselves even i f the Russians have not done so.
If lvest Germans can replace other vJestern forces i n nerlin and if
Soviet troops are

withdr~qn

from the city, at least the rudiments

of an all-German administrati on of nerlin will ex1st .

If this ad-

ministratl. on operated, on an interim basis, under ultimate U.N. or
other international control, wi th guaranteed rights of free access
to all from all directions,_ a ne't·1 and more durable s i tuation might
exist in nerlin than that which now prevails.
I should be less than frank, Mr. Presi dent, if I did not
state my view that we have not yet sufficiently explored the potential role of the United Nations and
tion.

\rlest

Germans in the Berlin situa-

1 think there is time to remedy that shortcoming.

Indeed,

it might well be done in coniunction with the coming exchanges between

r1r. Eisenhower and

i-lr.

Khrushchev.
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If pxesent tendenci es in ti1e Uestern a lJ.:!.ance pexsist,
I am afraid it "t·1ill not be long before the handvn:iting l'lill be very
evident on the wall.

Increasingly, individual states or inner

groups of states, in pursuit of their own immediate national advantage and oblivious or indifferent to the needs of others will
spur the xest to the same course.

The short-range interests of

each shall take precedence over the long-range needs of all and to
the degree that they do so the house of Hestern unity, built with
great caxe and at great expense, will be threatened.
the institutions are likely to remain but they

~-1:.:11

To be sure,
be, increasingly,

stripped of substance.
I do not know whether present trends can be

rev~s ed.

I do not lmot-1 hm-1 much i nfluence the United States can exer-t to
that end.

The fact is that major changes have tal-:en place vlithin

Hestern Europe i n recent years.

The effect, perhaps the inevitable

effect, of these changes has been to reduce the i nfluence of the
United States and to heighten that of the Europeans themselves i n
European a f fai rs.
It 't'lill serve no useful purpose to, 't-Jring our hands over
this s i tuation, to look for s capegoats, or to conti nue to bury the
problem in 't'lords of uni ty and i tDLlodest presumpti ons of American
leadershi p as usual.

~ather,

it

w~ ll

be better to learn to live

with the changes i n Europe 't'lhi ch v1e did so much to bri ng about
wi th the i1arshall Plan and our actual postwar leadership.

Uhat is

important now is to try to preserve 't·lhat needs to be preserved, to
try to preserve the essenti als of Uestern unitx.
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It is helpful, I
Europe.

bel:~eve,

that the !?.:esident has gone to

He is, in his person, one of the great symbols of Hestern

cooperation.

I do not think, however, that symbols are enough.

Not even t·7ell-spoken "mrds of unity are enough.

He have had those

at every conference of the Uestern nations but the differences have
continued to accumulate.
I believe the time has come to pnt as:Lde the generalizatiom on unity and to loolt squarely at, and talk frankly to, the
points of clisunity in the \·Jestern alb.ance.

I think the time has

come for a blunt conference which puts the cards on the table with
respect to the condit-1on of H.A.T.O.
tent of the erosion.

Ue

neec~

He need to delineate the ex-

to determine 't'lhat revisions are neces-

sary to revitalize this organization and other i nstitutions of
Hestern unity in the light of the changing European situation.

In

short t'le need to face t'lhat it is that is bothering the members of
the Hestern alliance :tf t'le are to do anything construct:t.ve about
the difficulties .
I think the time has come , especially, for a frank conference on the economic rivalries which are beginning to plague the
European nations and which, sooner or later, t-1-ll1 make their effect
felt on this country.
It may be, finally, that the time has come for us to move
out of the full glare of the spotlight of NATO activity and to
welcome

from~e

Europeans--nritish, French, Itali ans, Germans, and

others--the assumption of a &reater measure of leadership in its
undertakings, a greater measure of responsibility and contribution

- 14 ..

commensurate with their ;p.:.'m·l::_ng s trengtl1; apcl
in Europe.

i:h~-~v..£.! v:!.1!B.,

situation

I trust that this observation will not be interpreted

as an advocacy of American
tended as such.

~lithdrawal

from Europe.

It is not in-

I!.ather, ·: t is intended as a frank recognition that

circumstances have changed in Europe and, in conseguence, a change
in the

pos~tion

of the United States in T·Jestern European affairs may

also be \'larranted and desirable.

The /:.mericas
Turning next to Lat:!.n Jl.merica, Nr. President, it seems
to me that the situation, pa::t:·.cularly in the Caribbean, is a most
uncertain one.

It is going to require patience and great effort

by all of the American states ::.£ a series of little 't'lars spawned
by d::.ctatorship and revolut:.on is not to

plag~e

that region for

months or, perhaps, even yea::s to come.
Hhen a revolutionary fervor. nurtured on years of oppression and brt..1tality achieves its ends, perhaps counter-e:tcesses are
inevitable.

Tyranny is grim bus~ness and it is not scrprising that

it p_rq_duc_es revolut:..ons uhich are also grim in their consequences.
Dut, Mr. Pres:..dent , there comes a moment for an end to
e:tcesses.

There comes a time to settle dO'tro to construction of the

new after destruction o~ the old, a time to put aside the fury, if
the high ideals which clr·ive men to understandable revolt are not
to be lost in a continuing f .. ow of blood and hatred.
I hope that moment "t>7ill not be lost in the situation in
the Caribbean .

If it is not ~ost, ~~~~~s reason to believe that
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we are at the beginnings of a beginning of a ne,·J and pro11tising era
·in inter-American relations.
This new stirring, I believe, found off:!.cial eJcpression
in the recent Declaration of Santiago.

Unless I misinterpret that

document, it points to a further evolution in inter-American relations.

The Americas, I believe, may be on the verge of bringing

into the Good Neighbor concept--::.nto the doctrine of non-intervention--anothe~

concept: that of the Conscience of the Americas .

If

this interpretation is correct, it means that as the Hemisphere deplores intervention in the affairs of one nation by another, it
deplores egually the brutal
decency

an~~here

den~al,

by dictatorship, of basic human

in the hemisphere.

Good Neighbors normally stay out of each other's family
affairs and those who meddle or intervene are rightfully condemned.
But sometimes the affairs in one house reach such a point of tyranny
that good neighbors can no longer be indifferent to the agony of
injustice and brutality

't·lh~ch

emanates from it.

No single American

nation can decide when that po·lnt has been reached .
or_ three.

Not even t't-70

Dut, it seems to me that when two-thirds or three-

quarters of the American republics reach such a conclusion, then
the good conscience of the entire community is involved and the
community has a responsibility to do someth:.ng about it.
l1r • President,
ways, to

mal~e

~~e

In time,

shall find 't'lays, common 't'lays, inter-American

the distaste and indignation of the Americas felt

by those 't'lho outrage the conscience of the Americas.

?erhaps, then,

we shall see an end to the cycle of dictatorship, revolution,

•

- 10 dictatorship which for, too long, has been the curse of many parts
of this

hem~sphere.

For our part, r·i r . Pres::dent, I believe our policies are
evolving to adjust to the chang:'.ng concept uhich I have just outlined, as well as to other new needs of inter-American relations.
The change comes in good time because, for years, we have been
consuming the goodwill which the Good Neighbor policy of another
generation created.

The intentions of the people of the United

States, as expressed in the
been good.

~·fuere

Cong~ess

we have failed is

these past few years, have
~n

the administration of policy.

In that connection, we have sho-vm a singular lack of awareness of
the changes in attitudes, hopes, needs and values in Latin America.
In consequence, we failed to develop the new ::deas, the alert
leadership and the inspired official representation in Latin
P~erica

which would permit us to act in accord with these changes.

Now that defect is, I hope, in the process of

be~ng

remedied.

The initiative has come largely from the Congress.

I

have in mind particularly the -v1or!<. of the Subcommittee under the
Chairmanship of the Senator from Oregon (i1r. Morse), end the bold
and constructive ideas of the Senator from Florida (i.'I.:-. Smathers)
\'1ho has shown such a consistent and intelligent interest in that
area .

I believe, too, that the ::ncreasing currency -v1bich has been

given in this country to the viet·7S of the

dist~nguished

Puert o R!.co (i1r. L'iunoz l'Iar:tn) and to the Puerto n.ican
generally has been most helpful.

Governor of

e~cperience

•

- 17 Hr . President, I should ll_ke, to . ~.§d
tion to these remarks on the Amer::.cas.

..9£~

~Jhen l'le

f•1.::;t:1e1: observatalk of the Ameri-

cas, scarcely, if ever, is G.!,_nada included in our thoughts.
is not merely oversight.
usage behind it.

That

It is a habit of m:i.nd t>lith decades of

It seems to me that it is high time to raise the

question as to t-1hether this habit of mind
in the mid-tt>Jent'!..eth century or

~1~1ether

conti!!.!:!.~ to

have validity

it survives on sheer 5.nert:i.a

alone.
Personally, I beliave that it is the latter.
has taken a

s~gnificant

this situation.

I am

initiative in recent years,

thin~dng

~n

Congress
remedying

nm-r of the wo:ck of the Canadian-

United States Interparl!araentary Group.

Cn the Senate side, this

,..10rlc is being carried out under the Chairmanship of the able, constructive, and conscientious Senator from Vermont (Hr. Aiken) and
hW contribution has been an outstanding one.
t'ir. President, I recogn::.ze that Canada has far flung

.c ommitments, in the CommonHealth, in the United Nations and in
other associations .

I wonder, however 2 whether the time has not

come for the American Republics to recognize that Canada ·is also
of the &uericas and may have much to offer and to gain by closer
association with the other nations of this hemisphere?

t·Jhat I am

suggest:.ng, Nr . President, is that i t may be desirable to undertake
in the Canadian-United States parl~amentary meetings and in other
appropriate t-rays, a preliminary eKploration to determine whether or
not Canadian membership in, or association with the Organization of
the P~erican States may not be o£ benefit to all concerned.

- lG -

Cur attention of late, Nr. President, has been fixed on
Germany, Europe and Latin America.
being

'\vorld-"~;·lide,

nut the scope of our relations

1;-1e may anticipate that from time to time other

nations, other areas will move into the forefront of our awareness.
Rarely i n the spot-light, yet never far from it is the
emerging continent of ne-v1 nations in Africa.

Since 1951, six in-

dependent countries have appeared in regi ons which were formerly
colonies.

I believe that 1;-1e have a good chance to get off on the

right foot 'l;·J ith these ne't'7 nations.
State in response to the

~nitiat :ve

Certainly, the Department of
of Congress, has reorganized

in a fashion \-Jhich creates a better opportuni ty to bring about
that result.

He~etofore,

niches in the various

Afri can affairs were buri ed in separate

Eu~opean

Desks.

Nmv, however, on the basis

of legislation pressed by the di sti nguished Chairman-Emeritus of
the Foreign Relations Committee (Hr. Green) there i s an Assistant
Secretary

o~

State for

Afr~can

A£fai rs.

This means among other

things, Hr. President, that offic i al informati on and evaluations
w::_th respect to the Afri can nations no longer
the

viev~oint

a~e

passed through

of other countries and areas before they flow into

total United States poli cy.

In short, Hr. !?resident, the indepen-

dent nations of Afri ca now stand on an equal footi ng with those of
Europe, Asi a and else\-Jhere, as far as the machinery of our foreign
policy is concerned.
Else\'lhere i n the world, Hr. President, with rare exceptions, \'le are just muddli ng along i n the patterns of past policy,

- 19 ..
at great

e~(pense

to the pwbl::..c and "t·lith few tangible ev::.dences of

achievements leading to a. greater stab::J.ity and progress in those
areas and, hence, to more benefic:!.al rele.tious w·:th them in the
f-uture.
In the Hiddle East, fo:c example, ''le find the same tendencies, as in the past, to transfer high official hopes, almost
in desperation, from ruler to ruler, from nation to nation, as the
sands of international political intrigue in that region shift
first in one direction and then in another.

The i.!:5_senhot-7er Doc-

trine, as many of us anticipated at the time i.t t·1as enunciated 1
lies almost buried in these sands.

The naghdad Pact acquires a

net'l name but even less content.
And still, the real problems of the ti:.ddle East remain:
The refugees; the denial of the use of Suez on an equal basis to
all; the monstrous poverty and ignorance of the many in the midst
of the vast wealth and culture of the few; the border questions
and the smoldering hatred and susp::cion between Israeli and Arab.
None of these--the real problems of the t-Iiddle East--appear to be
any closer to solution than they t·1 ere a decade ago.
the

outpour~ng

of

publ~c

Nevertheless

funds for the region goes on in the bland

assumpti on that we are doing something about these problems.

How

much longer, llr. President?
Sooner or later, in the administration of

pol~cies

with

respect to the i·1 iddle East we are going to have to ma!<e up our
minds.

Sooner or later t'le are going to have to face the fact that,

for this nati on as a t'lhole, there are some things more important

-
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than Niddle Eastern oil, mil:;.tary bases or the soothing of the
ultra-nationalistic tantrums of one nation or another.
Sooner or later, we are going to have to decide who in
the Middle East works sincerely and with forebearance to end the
state of fear and incip:.ent war which prevails in that region and
who :;.ntrigues to perpetuate it.

Ue are go:i.ng to have to decide

which govetnments render a decent measure of justice to their
peoples and act for their peaceful progress and
e~~ploit

wh~ch

governments

their passions for selfish or destructive ends.
Hhen we have made these dec isions then, perhaps, 't'le may

be able to devise policies for "t·Ihich

't1e

need not apologize, poli-

cies which 't'lill have some strength to stand i n the midst of political intrigue and
policies

~1hich ~1ill

aga~nst

the :nroads of corumunism into the region--

begin to bring to an end the largely indis-

criminate use of public funds for

~·.1hat

are often self-defeating

purposes.
Further to the East, Nr. President, movi ng tm-1ards the
Pacific, there is little in the s:tuation in which to find comfort.
tle go on, as we have been do:Lng for yea.rs, spending,

"~:'lith

little

question, vast sums of public funds, at best to hold a line against
communism.

Yet despite this outpouring, the line shows signs of

breaking down in a Laos just a fe't'l months after 't•7e have been told
that foreign aid had built the line solid in that country.
when a situation of that k i nd ari ses,
what ::.s the answer, Hr. President?
the same pattern as in the past .

~·1hen

And

it catches us unaware,

Hore of the same; more a id in

•
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As for stability and

iu any of these nations,

e}ccept in Japan and in India and one or two isolated spots, there
is little evidence of tt.

The lot of vast populations remains just

about as miserable as ever; the enticements of authoritarianism
are as intense as ever.

I repeat, Hr . President, as far as United

States policies in As i a are concerned, they constitute, largely,
an enormously costly holding action from Korea to Pa!d.stan and a
holding action of very

reliability.

dub ~.ous

dent, they constitute a hold:.ng action which
ing overtones.

I refe1: to what

military or quasi-military
and southeast Asia.

:~_s,

Horeover, Nr. Presi-t

s developing disturb-

apparently) a trend tO't'lards

author~tarian

dictatorships in southern

Those 't·7ho administer our polJ.cies seem in-

clined to look the other

~qay,

to find the rationalizations which

put off the facing of the .:-eal; t ·: es

-~nherent

in tld.s trend.

be sure, one can find good :i.n the development.

H::.l:;_tary dictator-

ships produce more stability and order, at first.
to deal with, at first.

To

They are easier

They even promise a measure of progress

away from the corrupt·i on, the inertia, the inadequacy that char~~terized

many of the predecessor governments, at first.
nut, Nr . President, no person bred i.n this nation--alive

to its premise that man is

f~t

to govern himself--no person bred

in that tradition can look with equanimity, much less with eagerness, on the appearance of military or guasi-mi1itary regimes in
so many lands l-lith which

't•le

are intimately assoc·i a ted.

I must ask,

Mr. President, is this the only answer which freedom can pose to
communism?
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ble for the
programs
this

adm~nistration

kno~1

of our policies and particularly our aid

"that they are do::ng.

military-a~thor~tar~an

porary phenonemon, that

~t

trend

I can only express the hope that
~n

non-Commun:st

~sia

is a tem-

is a step towards responsible and popu-

larly responsive government in these lands.
There are thin3s worse than

instabil5~ty

in this 't>lorld

and one of them is the iron hand of tyranny--communist or any other.
I cannot look

w~th

pride on any acti.on of this govemmert, advertent

or inadvertent, that acts to close that hand on any people--no, not
even in the mistaken zeal that this

t-1-f

11 somehm'l save them and us

from communism.

Administrat~on

of Policy

In my remarks so far, Nr . President, I have been discuss:':.ng matters over 't·lhich, for the most part,
nation--e~tercise

unilateral control.

do not--as a

\·J hat happens in the Far East,

the Hiddle East, in Europe, the Americas or
our capacity alone to determine.

"t·le

else~·1here

is not l'lithin

Nor is the responsibility for

developments there un:':.quely that of this Administration or any
other.

In most parts of the v10rld our influence ranges from im-

portant to peripheral but, in a practical sense, it is not absolute
an~·7here

and the sooner we disabuse oo.1rselves of any idea that it

is, the sooner t'1e shall use with greater deftness, with less waste
of public resources, such influence as we do nossess.
4

•
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~-s

wholly

~1ithin

the prov::nce of the United States, uherein respon-

sibil·lty ::ests solely w=:th this nation.
't'lh::ch 't'le
made it
t~e

ma!~e

~,p,

~n

;.:rp our minds in foreign pol:'.cy and, after 'tole have

't'lhat

't·le

do and the t·1ay tl1e do it .

In sho1:t, I refer to

formclation and administration of policy.
Other nations do not tell

regards its fo-r-e,gn relations.
the

I refe-r- to the manner

c~rcumstances

our decisions.

th~s

nat::on t-Jhat to decide, as

To be sure the atticudes of others,
relationsh~ps

abroac, our

w::th others influence

Indeed they should, for tle are not a nation in a

pressurized nose-cone someohere off in space.

Dut at-1areness of

the rest of the world, nott·lithstanding, :.n the last analysis, 't·7e
decide for ourselves.

i~e

act fm: o·..trselves.

cisions or urong ciecis::ons.
a result.

He

ma~<e

right de -

Ue act ?.nteU.::gently or foolishly as

And tle bear the respona::.bf_lity fo-.: these national de-

cisions and actions.

In short, the

stop at the t·7ater 1 s edge.

bac~-2assing

stops or shoulc

He- -not others--ceterm::ne for uhat pur-

pose t·Je have a State Department, an aid-administration, a Central
Intelligence Agency, an Infol.'"tllati.on
_a_g_e_n_~ies

Serv:~ce

and a host of other

v1hich carry on act:_vities abro.:.d on the bas::s of appro-

pr::ations
oublic funds and on behalf of the ent:_re nation.
- ------ ..from
- _......__
He alone_ decid~ ho~., th_e y__s!1a]J ['Unction.
t·Jhen I u se the term

11

we ," i>ir. Pres :"_ dent, I mean , of

course, the people of the United States.

In matters of foreign

relations, however, the responsibility for i nterpreti ng what we
t-lant and hot'l t·7e are to pursue it rests, in a theoret:!.cal sense,
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at great

e:l~pense

to the p';.!bl::.c and '\·Jith few tangible evi.dences of

achievements leading to a greater stability and progress in those
areas and, hence, to more benefici al relations with them in the
f-uture.
In the Hiddle East, for example,

'~e

find the same ten-

dencies, as in the past, to transfer high official hopes, almost
in desperation, from ruler to ruler, from nation to nation, as the
sands of international

po~itical

intrigue in that region shift

first in one direction and then in another.

The Eisenhower Doc-

trine, as many of us anticipated at the time ::.t '\·l as enunciated,
lies almost buried in these sands.

The Baghdad Pact acguires a

new name but even less content.
And still, the real problems of the N:..ddle East remain:
The refugees; the denial of the use of Suez on an equal basis to
all; the monstrous poverty anci ignorance of the many in the midst
of the vast '\-Jealth and cultm:e of the few; the border questions
and the smoldering hatred and suspicion between Israeli and Arab.
None of these--the real problems of the Niddle East--appear to be
any closer to solution than they were a decade ago.

Nevertheless

the outpouring of public funds for the region goes on in the bland
assumption that we are doing

someth~ng

about these problems.

How

much longer, Hr. President?
Sooner or later, in the administration of poli cies with
respect to the Middle East we are going to have to make up our
minds.

Sooner or later we are going to have to face the fact that,

for this nation as a whole, there are some things more important

.
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the elected President, acting in some ::.nstances 't'lith the advice

and consent of the elected Senate and in others

~1ith

the concurrence

of the elected Congress.
That is the Constitutional theory, l,lr . :?resident, but 't'Jhat
is the fact':'

The fact is that the po-v1er to interpret the will of

the nation in respect to our vast and complicated relations

~1ith

the rest of the l'Wrld has been diffused through the enormous
labyrinth of the

El~ecutive

nranch of the government .

decide, in short, has been scattered and

The pouer to

to the point where

d:~luted

it has become virtually impossib1e to fix responsibility.

It has

been scattered and diluted to the point where it has become virtually impossible to use the public pm·1er effectively to bring
about adjustments in policy and

~ ts

administration at somewhere near

the time that these ad ·justments are needed.
In these c:rcumstances, national interests freguently become so interwoven ,.Jith bureaucrat·i c i nterests ancl conflicts that
we are less and less able to adjust the total needs
to the changing circumstances

o~

the Horld.

o~

the nation

Hore and more we have

a policy determined by El{ecutive agency accommoda::5.on anG less and
less by the leadership and decision oZ the responsible political
officials of the Admini3trat:on and the Congress.

I believe the

able Senator from Hinnesota (Hr. Humphrey) illustrated thi.s point
most forcibly a short t i me ago on the floor with regard to policy
formulation on the testing of nuclear "Vleapons.

He shm-1ed hm-1

agency conflicts were producing a situation that undercut our

')
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negoti a t ors ::n Geneva.

H:::.s ota.tement appa::ent l y

\1as hee.~· cl

at the

Hhite House for the President made a decision on this question
shortly thereafter.

But, i 1Ir. Pres:.dent, thi s :!.s the !dnd of de-

cision which should be forthcoming promptly withi n the Admi nistration on the basi s of need.

It ought not to require prodding from

the Senate.
I realize that th::s problem has been wi th the nation for
a long time.
i'Il".

It is not amenable to easy solution.

President, we must deal

':·7i t~l

Nevertheless,

i t, i f respons i ble government i n

the field of foreign poli cy ::s not to degenerate i nto a catchphrase.

Ue must stay wi.th thi.s problem--the President and the

Congress--until i t yi elds to rati onal solution.
The able Senator from Hashington (Hr. Jeckson) has recogni zed the deplorable creak::_nes s of the decis i on-maki ng machinery
of the nati on i n criti cal matters of foreign relations and defense.
He has suppli ed the
·i nve st ~.gat ion

of the

in ~ t iat~ve

and set i n motion a special Senate

of the problem whi ch has been promised the cooperation

Ad~in~stration.

That coo? erati on is essenti al because re-

spons::bi lity for this problem rests pri marily and preponderantly
with the Admi ni strati on.
I

should

lil~e

to suggest, Nr. Presi dent, that we may

find the way to a reasonable

sol~tion

to this Qroblem in a diligent

assertion of the primary authori ty of the

Pres ~dency

i n matters

directly or ::ndirectly related to fore ign policy and a reassertion,
under the President, of the responsi bi lity of the Secretary and
the Department of State for the conduct of foreign relations.
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If the Department of State ::s not or3an:·.zed to handle
these matters in thei r totality, then let us
; s not egu:.".pped, then let us equ1.p :;.t .

it.

reorgan~ze

If i ts personnel :ts not

properly trained, then let us seek to provide the tra:."..n:!.ng.
it has not

us

mal~e

s~ ff:."..cient

If it

resources, f :.". n ancial or

othenq~ se,

If

then let

these resources available to it.
Dut let us not, in an effort to compensate for the real

or imagined shortcomings of the Department of State so scatter
responsib:tl:!.t::es in foreign re,at-i ons through the military departments! the agr:."..cultural department, the I.C.A. 2 the C.I.A., the
Commerce Department or ,.qhatever, that the costs of administeri ng
foreign poli cy r i se enormously and, in ratio, the constructive
resu lts decli ne

drast:~cally.

:·!e have already carri ed this process

so far that in our official representation abroad, the employees
of the Department of State, numerous as they may be, are in many
instances far outnumbered by the representatives of other United
States agencies.

And although the Department of State bears ulti·

mate responsibility for relations abroad, it

e:~erc i ses

only the

most nominal influence over the use of the resources and the actions
of

~h~ p~~son~el

of these other agencies.

I believe this sessi on of the GGth Congress has made a
highly si gnif:.". c ant advance whi ch can act to bri ng about a major
improvement in the administration of foreign relat::.ons.

I refer

to the authori zing legislati on t-1hich the Congress has passed in
the field of foreign-ai d.

If it i s reasonably i nterpreted by the

...
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One amendment provides for an inspector-general in the Department
of State to probe the weaknesses in every aspect of the aid·
program.

A second provides for the ending of the non-security re-

lated secrecy which has surrounded this program.

Still another

separates military aid from other forms of aid but provides for
close control over the entire program by the

Secreta~,

of State.

Finally, t1r. President, a fourth amendment requires the Executive
Branch to submit plans for the gradual texminat!on of massive
grants, as the program moves more and more to a loan basis.

These

amendments, Hr. President, can do much to end aid by force of habit
and to give to the program more purpose and direction within the
context of our total policy.

They can reduce the '-1aste and any

tendencies towards corrupt practices.
The Congressional action on foreign aid,

~tt.

President,

is only a first step in bringing about a more integrated, streamlined and responsible administration of the nation's international
affairs.

Much remains to be done in regard to other agencies which

have injected themselves or have been injected into these matters
without adequate coordination under the Secretary of State and
without adequate control by the elected officials of this government.

- .
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Concluding Comments

Mr. President, I have talked at great length today.

But

there is much that needs sayi ng on this subject of the nation's
foreign relations and their administration. much more than I have
said.

I wanted these thoughts, hm·1 ever, to be on the Record at

this time.

For, in the near future, discussions will be raking

place between the President and t1r. Khrushchev and others of the
highest importance to the nation.

It is possible to question the

wisdom of these meetings at this point in time and circumstance,
as has been done.

But the decision to hold them has been made by

the President and, at a recent press conference, he put the significance of these meetings in proper perspective when in response
to questions as to their propriety he stated:
about the human race and

~1hat

"vJe are talking

's going to happen to it' 1 and

any

1

President that refused finally to use the last atom of prestige
or the last atom of his energy /rn this quest for

peac~7 • • •

ought to be condemned by the American people. il
Yet these impending discussions--however sell-intentioned
--are but a part of the search for a better road for this nation
and mankind.

The work of securing the

the people of the United States
exchanges.

~-1ill

~-1ell-being

and the peace of

not end with the impending

He shall be better prepared to do what still needs to

be done if we understand more clearly the worlm1ide dimensions of
the undertaking which confronts us, if we ready our spirits and
determination for the tasks which the impending conferences may
make possible.

